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Abstract
This paper develops a model of social interactions and endogenous poverty traps. The
key idea is captured in a framework in which the likelihood of future social interactions with
members of one’s group is partly determined by group-speciﬁc investments made by individuals.
I prove three main results. First, some individuals expected to make group-speciﬁc capital
investments are worse oﬀ because their observed decision is used as a litmus test of group
loyalty — creating a tradeoﬀ between human capital and cooperation among the group. Second,
there exist equilibria which exhibit bi-polar human capital investment behavior by individuals
of similar ability. Third, as social mobility increases this bi-polarization increases. The models
predictions are consistent with the bifurcation of distinctively black names in the mid-1960s,
the erosion of black neighborhoods in the 1970s, accusations of ‘acting white,’ and the eﬃcacy
of certain programs designed to encourage human capital acquisition.
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The usual caveat applies.
1“I got there [Holy Providence School in Cornwall Heights, right outside Philadelphia]
and immediately found that I could read better than anyone else in the school. My
father’s example and my mother’s training had made that come easy; I could pick up
a book, read it aloud, pronounce the words with proper inﬂections and actually know
what they meant. When the nuns found this out they paid me a lot of attention, once
even asking me, a fourth grader, to read to the seventh grade. When the kids found
this out, I became a target....
It was my ﬁrst time away from home, my ﬁrst experience in an all black situation, and
I found myself being punished for everything I’d ever been taught was right. I got all
A’s and was hated for it; I spoke correctly and was called a punk. I had to learn a new
language simply to be able to deal with the threats. I had good manners and was a
good little boy and paid for it with my hide.”
––Abdul-Jabbar, et. al., 1987, p.16.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A century and a half after the treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand, six decades after Myrdal’s
account of race relations in the United States, and nearly a half century past Jim Crow in the
U.S. and constitutionally recognized positive discrimination in India, social life around the world
is characterized by signiﬁcant racial and ethnic inequality. Many economic indices prove as much:
wages, unemployment rates, income and wealth levels, standardized test scores, incarceration rates,
and health and mortality statistics, all diﬀer substantially across racial and ethnic categories.
An explanation that has garnered considerable attention from social scientists in discussions
surrounding racial inequality in the US is that peers and communities impose costs on members
who try to ‘act white’ (Fordham and Ogbu 1986, Austen-Smith and Fryer 2005). In this literature,
minorities are seen as punishing other minorities for investing in behaviors that are deemed as the
prerogatives for non-minorities (i.e. making good grades, listening to certain types of music, having
non-minority friends, showing interest in classical music or ballet, and so on).
The limitations of the discussion, to date, is the microcosmic concentration on diﬀerences be-
2tween blacks and whites.1 If indeed there were an identiﬁable phenomenon, one would expect it to
apply more generally. For example, in some Hispanic communities, women are discouraged from
higher education and encouraged to be domesticated. In some traditional Amish communities,
education is uniformly discouraged. In the Italian immigrant community in Boston’s West End
circa 1957, those who invested in education were labeled “mobiles” and “sissies.” In the Latino
community of greater Los Angeles, those who do not invest in suﬃcient amounts of local culture
are labeled “Pocha.” The Buraku of Japan either invest in their culture or disassociate themselves
and attempt to achieve in the outside world. These latter examples do not occupy much space in
the current literature involving racial and ethnic disparities, and more importantly, the trade-oﬀ
between intra-group cooperation and economic success in the larger society.2
The literatures involving social stratiﬁcation and inequality between and among racial groups
in economics, sociology, and anthropology, unfortunately have diﬀerent behavioral theories for
each racial and ethnic group. These theories endeavor to explain diﬀerences in various social
statistics (wages, unemployment rates, standardized test scores, and so on, e.g.) by bringing to
bear contextual and group speciﬁc accounts that are rarely applicable to other minority groups.
What is needed is a simple, empirically tractable, theoretical speciﬁcation that is broad enough
to encompass many diverse groups, but simple enough to have empirical content. This suggests
a theory that encompasses the historic work on Italian immigrants in Boston (Gans 1962) and
blacks on the South Side of Chicago in the 1930’s (Drake and Cayton 1945) as well as recent work
on ‘acting white’ (Fordham and Ogbu 1986, Fryer and Torelli 2005) and the ultra-orthodox Jews
(Berman 2000), and applies more generally across many ethnic and racial groups.
With these ambitions in clear view, I present a simple model of social interactions and endoge-
nous poverty traps that can be applied to many diverse communities. In particular, the theory
applies to any group that requires its members to make costly community speciﬁc investments
needed to facilitate local interaction with members of the community, but may run in conﬂict with
economic success in the larger society. Examples of these communities include, but are not lim-
1Ogbu (1986) is a notable exception.
2This is not meant to overlook the contributions by Bowles and Gintis (2004a, 2004b), Greif (1994), Iannacone
(1992), Lazear (1999), and Berman (2000) which examine the intersection of culture and economic outcomes. The
model to be presented is quite complementary to their work. There are, however, distinct empirical predictions which
are highlighted in section 2.
3ited to, the Romany of Europe (Lee and Warren 1991), American Indians (Sowell 1994), Amish
(Hostetler 1974), African-Americans (Fordham and Ogbu 1986), Hispanics (Fryer and Torelli 2005),
West Indian immigrants (Waters 1999), the Maori of New Zealand (Ausubel 1977), the Sephardic
Jews of Israel (Ogbu 1986), the Buraku of Japan (Devos and Wagatsuma 1966), Australian Abo-
rigines (Altman and Nieuwenhuysen 1979), French Canadians, especially in Quebec and Montreal
(Goyer 1983), and the coastal communities of Papua New Guinea.
Consider a stylized illustration of a community with many agents, set in Catalonia, Spain,
which captures some of the basic ideas and intuitions. Each agent decides whether to invest their
time in learning Catalan (a romance language spoken mainly by the local population) or com-
puter programming. Investments in computer programming are valued in the global labor market,
whereas, Catalan is only valued in the small local community. Agents observe each other’s invest-
ment portfolio and can calculate the conditional probability of any agent being in the community
in the future. Investments in Catalan yield a relatively high probability of being in the community
in the future, since it is not valued elsewhere, and investments in computer programming yield a
relatively low probability. The agents, then, play an inﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma with
varying opponents, deciding whether or not to cooperate or defect in any given period, knowing
their history of actions will be common knowledge. Cooperation, in this framework, can be inter-
preted as community interaction, the beneﬁt of which is increasing in the time allocated to learning
Catalan. In this stylized illustration, the prisoner’s dilemma payoﬀs are quite natural. One can
envision that agents will only cooperate if they observe suﬃcient investment in Catalan skills (i.e.
the likelihood of being in the community in the future is relatively high).
Analyzing the model illuminates three basic categorizations of equilibria, the existence of which
depends on particular parameter values. (1) There exist equilibria in which the most talented
agents in a community refuse to invest in their group-speciﬁc capital in an eﬀort to maximize
their potential in the larger society, while less talented individuals invest in suﬃcient amounts
to diﬀerentiate themselves from the high ability agents. This allows low ability agents to beneﬁt
from cooperation in lieu of labor market success. (2) There also exist equilibria in which everyone,
regardless of innate ability, invests only in their group-speciﬁc capital, and refuse to invest in
general human capital, even when they know that it is highly valued in the market. This is
likely to happen when agents believe that the probability of interacting with members in their
4community in the future is highly non-responsive to investments in human capital. (3) There exists
equilibria with the property that agents either invest all of their energies into human capital, or
they do not invest anything. Analytically, this bipolarization follows from a highly non-concave
objective function; optimal human capital investments do not vary continuously with ability. This
leads to the unexpected conclusion that two agents, with slightly diﬀerent innate ability, can have
drastically diﬀerent optimal human capital investments, and these diﬀerences are exaggerated as
social mobility out of a community increases; a key prediction that diﬀerentiates the current model
from previous work.
It is argued that the model’s predictions are consistent with the rapid adoption of distinctively
black names in the late 1960’s, the bifurcation of black communities in the 1970’s, the so-called
‘acting white’ phenomenon, and the eﬃcacy of certain educational and job interventions designed
to encourage investment among at-risk youth.
The theory provides a simple analytic framework that helps explain inter and intra group
diﬀerences, without relying on diﬀerences in exogenously distributed tastes or innate ability. The
only diﬀerence between groups (if any) is in the speciﬁcity of the group-speciﬁc investments needed
to facilitate cooperation within a given community or group and its ability (or lack thereof) to
stimulate human capital investments, and the likelihood of continued group interaction as a function
of human capital acquisition.
Throughout the text, I give special emphasis to the education of African Americans in the
U.S., though I envision much broader implications. This is not a theory narrowly tailored to the
experience of African Americans. It is motivated by ethnographies highlighting similar behaviors of
lower class communities across the world and endeavors to understand these behaviors in a simple
equilibrium model.
insert ﬁgure 1
2 A Model of Social Interactions and Endogenous Poverty Traps
A. Basic Building Blocks
Let there be a continuum of agents with unit mass referred to as students and a ﬁnite set of
5agents referred to as (suitably anthropomorphized) communities.3 There are two types of commu-
nities: “poor” and “rich.” For simplicity, we assume all agents begin in the poor community.
Nature moves ﬁrst and distributes a type to each student. This type, denoted θ ∈
£
θ,θ
¤
,
represents a student’s innate ability, where θ denotes a student with relatively high ability, θ denotes
a student with relatively low ability; F (·) is the c.d.f. of θ. Then, a student, knowing her private
ability, makes a group-speciﬁc capital investment decision c ∈ [0,1]. Think of c as the fraction
of time that a student spends on group-speciﬁc investments — such as learning Catalan.4 Hence,
h =1− c denotes the student’s human capital investment.5 The community, then, observes each
student’s group-speciﬁc capital investment, c, and plays an inﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma
(hereafter referred to as the social interaction game) with the student, where both the student and
the community decide whether to cooperate or defect in each period. This interaction can continue
indeﬁnitely, but can also end in any period with probability (1 − δ(h)),w h e r eδ :[ 0 ,1] ⇒ [0,1]
denotes the probability that a student with human capital h will remain in the poor community in
the subsequent period.6 Notice, δ (h) need not be monotonic.
Strategies and Payoﬀs
A strategy for a student speciﬁes, for each type, the fraction of their time to be invested in human
and group-speciﬁc capital, and a sequence of decisions in the social interaction game. To represent
these strategies more formally, let A = {cooperate, defect} denote the set of realized choices in
the social interaction game, with typical element aj ∈ A, and let γ0 denote the null history. Let
Γt =( A)
t be the space of possible period t histories, and for t ≥ 1, let γt =( a0,a 1,....,at−1) be a
sequence of realized choices of actions at all periods before t. A strategy for a student, then, is a
3The conception that a student is interacting with a community may seem odd. This modeling strategy is a
reduced form of a more general model in which there exists a large set of agents that are randomly grouped in pairwise
matches in every period; if one assumes that the actions in any given match are common knowledge. Speciﬁcally, in a
more elaborate model with random matching, any student, i, behaves as if he were facing the average characteristics
of the set of agents with whom he is interacting. This is treated, formally, in an Appendix.
4Practical examples of these types of investments abound. In low-income black communities these investments
might be in language or learning to be “streetwise” (Anderson 1992). In Italian immigrant communities, investments
were in “the peer group society.” (Gans 1962)
5This does not presume, ap r i o r i , that human capital and cooperation are necessarily in conﬂict with one another
in one’s community.
6The functional form of δ(h) is common knowledge among the agents.
6function I :
£
θ,θ
¤
→ [0,1] and a sequence of maps ϕt
s : Γt × [0,1] ×
£
θ,θ
¤
→ [0,1]. A community’s
strategy is a sequence of decisions in the social interaction game, denoted ϕt
n : Γt × [0,1] → [0,1]
for all t. I focus on “grim trigger” strategies. In words, any player who deviates from cooperation
induces perpetual defection from the community. This is without loss of generality. If cooperation
can be supported by any strategy, it can also be supported by grim trigger strategies.
insert ﬁgure 2
The stage game payoﬀs of the social interaction game are represented in ﬁgure 2. Consistent
with the prisoner’s dilemma, I assume α>0,β<0, and µ>α . 7 There are several speciﬁcations
of payoﬀ functions found in the repeated game literature. I will focus on the case where players
discount future utilities using ρδ (h) ≤ 1, for all h, where ρ represents a standard discount rate.8
Let vj(h,θ) denote the value of being in community j vis-à-vis of labor market earnings, condi-
tional on being a type θ student who invested human capital h; vp(h,θ) (resp. vr(h,θ)) denotes the
value of being in a “poor” (resp. “rich”) community. Poor and rich communities diﬀer in myriad
ways, including institutional infrastructure, social interactions and networks, and so on. I assume
that
∂vj(h,θ)
∂θ > 0,
∂vj(h,θ)
∂h > 0,
∂vr(h,θ)
∂θ >
∂vp(h,θ)
∂θ , and vj (h,θ) is normalized to zero, all h,j.9 The
basic idea is that simply moving to a rich neighborhood (weakly) raises labor market earnings,
holding both ability and human capital constant, because of access to better social networks and
opportunities.
Equilibrium
I shall focus on pure strategy equilibria, in which each agent makes a deterministic choice and
all individuals of the same type make the same choice. The solution concept for this game, per
7In a more general setting, one might allow the payoﬀ to cooperation to be a function of group-speciﬁcc a p i t a l
investments. A dynamic extension incorporating this is available from the author upon request.
8The social interaction game is, perhaps, the most ad hoc piece of the model and deserves further justiﬁcation.
It is meant to represent any social interaction that can be categorized as a costly public good. A concrete example
is that of community policing or “watching each others back,” which is described beautifully in Anderson’s (1999)
intimate portrayal of the social interactions among black youth on the west side of Philadelphia and Gan’s (1962)
description of the Italian immigrant community in Boston’s West End.
9Similarly, if δ (·) is a function of θ, the same results are obtained—so long as δ (·) is non-increasing in θ.I nt h i s
case, however, one must assume that the community knows the student’s ability in order to solve the model.
7usual for repeated games, is Nash equilibrium. It is well known in the vast literature on repeated
games that when the players are suﬃciently patient, any ﬁnite gain from deviation of cooperation
(defecting when the other player cooperates) is outweighed by even a small loss in utility in every
future period, given the strategies are of grim trigger form. This implies, in the current framework,
there exists δ∗ such that for any δ(h) ≥ δ∗, cooperation can be sustained. This is the subject of
the ﬁrst result.
Proposition 1 If δ(·) is decreasing, grim trigger strategies constitute a cooperative Nash equilib-
rium of the inﬁnitely repeated game if and only if h ≤ h∗, where h∗ satisﬁes
δ (h∗)=
1
ρ
∙
1 −
α
µ
¸
(1)
Proof. A student will deviate in any period τ ≥ t if the expected discounted payoﬀ from
deviation is greater than the expected discounted returns for cooperating. The expected payoﬀ for
deviating in any period t can be written as: µ +
δ(h)vp(h,θ)+(1−δ(h))vr(h,θ)
(1−ρδ(h)) . The expected discounted
payoﬀ from cooperation can be seen as:
α+δ(h)vp(h,θ)+(1−δ(h))vr(h,θ)
(1−ρδ(h)) . Therefore, the student wants
to cooperate if and only if δ (h) ≥ 1
ρ[1− α
µ], which crosses once, given the assumptions on α(·) and
δ (·).
Proposition 1 delineates communities into those in which human capital and local cooperation
are diametrically opposed (δ decreasing) and those in which it need not be. If, for example, δ is
increasing (higher human capital implies a higher probability of future social interactions) only
individuals with suﬃcient amounts of human capital can glean cooperation from the community.
insert ﬁgure 3
To be sure, there is “nerd bashing” behavior in most neighborhoods, irrespective of race or
cultural aﬃliation. Yet, the tolerable level of human capital (h∗)c a nb eq u i t ed i ﬀerent across
communities.10 Consider ﬁgure 3, which illustrates a plausible δ for a hypothetical middle income
neighborhood. It assumes that those with extreme levels of human capital (high or low) are likely to
leave. Students in these communities cannot beneﬁt from cooperation if they invests too little (are
10In a more elaborate model in which the severity of punishment depends on the size of the group who are not
investing, punishments across neighborhoods could also be quite diﬀerent — further pushing down h
∗
8likely to move to poor neighborhoods) or too much (are likely to move to rich neighborhoods). In
this case, the student cooperates in social interactions only if he invests an interior h ∈
£
h,h
¤
.S o ,
students in middle class neighborhoods can face disincentives of investing in human capital similar
to those endured by students in low income neighborhoods. Again, however, h∗ will diﬀer between
these communities as δ(·) diﬀers. This captures a very nice feature of the model which warrants
further emphasis. The model of social interactions is ﬂexible enough to investigate antagonizing
behavior and under investment in education in many communities. The critical parameter is δ (·).
Let c∗ ≡ 1 − h∗, where h∗ is deﬁned by equation (1). If the community observes c ≥ c∗,
cooperation can be sustained and if they observe c<c ∗ it cannot. For simplicity and transparency,
I assume that the community (resp. student) will cooperate if and only if c ≥ c∗.11 Thus, the
student knows if he invests c ≥ c∗ in his group-speciﬁc capital, his peers will cooperate, and if not
they won’t. Let b α = α for all h ≤ h∗, and b α =0for all h>h ∗. With this, the student’s expected
utility can be readily derived. Once a student makes her group-speciﬁc capital decision, we know
δ (h), vp (h,θ), and vr (h,θ). Her utility in period one is comprised of her social payoﬀ (b α) and
her economic payoﬀ (vj (h,θ)), where the latter depends on her exit probability. In symbols, her
expected payoﬀ in period one is b α+δ (h)vp (h,θ)+(1− δ (h))vr (h,θ). Recall, with probability δ (h)
she stays in her community. Thus, if she stays in the game two periods, her two-period expected
payoﬀ can be written as
b α + δ (h)vp (h,θ)+( 1− δ (h))vr (h,θ)+ρδ (h)[b α + δ (h)vp (h,θ)+( 1− δ (h))vr (h,θ)].
Following this logic over an inﬁnite horizon, the student’s expected utility can be written as:
b U (h,θ) ≡
b α + δ (h)vp (h,θ)+( 1− δ (h))vr (h,θ)
1 − ρδ (h)
. (2)
This leads to the following concise characterization of equilibrium student behavior.
Proposition 2 In any cooperative Nash equilibrium, a type θ student chooses max
n
b U
³
b h,θ
´
, b U (1,θ)
o
,
where
b h(θ) ≡ argmax
h∈[0,h∗]
½
α + δ (h)vp (h,θ)+( 1− δ (h))vr (h,θ)
1 − ρδ (h)
¾
(3)
11There are many other equilibria in the social interaction game, even when agents are patient. However, cooper-
ation yields the payoﬀ dominant equilibrium in the inﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma.
9Proof. The community’s choice problem is trivial: cooperate if and only if they observe c ≥ c∗.
Expecting this, any student who optimally invests c<c ∗,c h o o s e sc =0( h =1 ) , since they derive no
beneﬁt from cooperation and cultural capital is costly. Let b h ≡ argmax
h∈[0,h∗]
n
α+δ(h)vp(h,θ)+(1−δ(h))vr(h,θ)
1−ρδ(h)
o
denote the student’s optimal level of human capital, conditional on ensuring cooperation from the
community. The students’ choice problem can then be summarized as choosing to either: “opt for
cooperation”
³
h = b h
´
or “opt out” (h =1 ). In symbols, the student chooses max
n
b U
³
b h,θ
´
, b U (1,θ)
o
.
Proposition 2 provides a simple dichotomous solution to a complicated decision problem. Stu-
dents either opt out — investing all of their time in human capital in an eﬀort to maximize their
utility, or opt for cooperation — under investing in human capital (relative to their optimum in a
community without the social interaction constraints) to assure cooperation from their community
and receive the social beneﬁts.
There are two cases to consider, which depend on how the student’s utility function varies
with h when he opts for cooperation. For convenience, let MB(h;θ) denote the marginal beneﬁt
of investing an additional unit in human capital, for a talent θ student, when a student opts
for cooperation, and MC(h;θ) denote the marginal cost.12 The marginal beneﬁt of investing an
additional unit of human capital, when the student opts for cooperation, is comprised of two parts.
First, additional human capital increases the value of being in both communities. Second, when a
student in the poor community invests more, he increases the likelihood of exit — yielding higher
expected payoﬀ. On the other hand, the marginal cost of investing in h consists of the lower
likelihood of receiving utility α from the social interaction game and the value vp(h,θ). This is the
basic economics of the student’s investment decision.
insert ﬁgure 4
Suppose that the objective function is increasing in human capital for all students who opt for
cooperation (MB(h;θ) >M C (h;θ) for all h ∈ [0,h ∗]). This will be the case when the payoﬀ to
cooperation in social interactions, α, is suﬃciently small. In this scenario, ﬁgure 4 represents the
students choice problem. We know that any student who opts out chooses h =1 , and any student
12MB(h;θ) and MC(h;θ) are derived by diﬀerentiating b U (h,θ) with respect to h and taking the positive elements
of the resulting equation to be MB(h;θ) and the negative elements to be MC(h;θ).
10who opts for cooperation chooses h = b h. These points are labeled in ﬁgure 4. Whether or not a
student chooses h = b h or h =1 , depends on his ability (θ). In particular, ﬁgure 4a represents a
student with relatively low θ and ﬁgure 4b represents a student with relatively high θ. One can
envision, then, situations in which large diﬀerences in human capital can occur among individuals
in the same community who have very similar innate ability. Given the continuity assumptions and
noting that the marginal value of opting out is increasing in θ, relative to opting for cooperation,
we know there exists a student of ability θ∗ who is just indiﬀerent between investing a lot (h =1 )
or investing substantially less (h = b h). Formally,
θ∗ solves
α + δ(b h)vp(b h,θ∗)+
³
1 − δ
³
b h
´´
vr
³
b h,θ∗
´
1 − ρδ
³
b h
´ =
δ(1)vp(1,θ∗)+( 1− δ (1))vr (1,θ∗)
1 − ρδ (1)
. (4)
The left hand side of (4) is strictly greater than the right hand side for θ suﬃciently small. This,
c o u p l e dw i t ht h ef a c tt h a tt h em a r g i n a lv a l u eo fa ni n c r e a s ei nθ is greater for those who opt out,
proves the existence of such a θ∗. Now consider the student who has ability θ∗ −ε. In this case, an
agent with slightly less ability, invests substantially less in human capital.
Let
S =
⎧
⎨
⎩
θ ∈
£
θ,θ
¤
:
α + δ(b h)vp(b h,θ)+
³
1 − δ
³
b h
´´
vr
³
b h,θ∗
´
1 − ρδ
³
b h
´ =
δ(1)vp(1,θ∗)+( 1− δ (1))vr (1,θ∗)
1 − ρδ (1)
⎫
⎬
⎭
denote the set of ability types that opt for cooperation. Notice: if the probability of being in the
community in the following period (δ (·)) is relatively inelastic (i.e., relatively non-responsive to h);
then the equilibrium exhibits bipolar investment behavior with small diﬀerences in innate ability,
leading to large human capital diﬀerences. These are qualitative predictions that cannot be found
in current models of social interaction.
insert ﬁgure 5
Things are quite diﬀerent when the student’s objective function is decreasing in human capital
for those who opt for cooperation (MB(h;θ) <MC (h;θ) for all h ∈ [0,h ∗]), which is the case when
α is suﬃciently large. Two prototypical examples are depicted in ﬁgure 5. This produces an even
stronger endogenous bipolarization; students in eﬀect choose h ∈ {0,1}. It is imperative to note,
however, that if the model were extended to allow students to decide whether or not to leave once
11they received an oﬀer in the rich neighborhood, this case would be eliminated. With this extension,
students would opt for cooperation and invests b h = h∗, even if α were large because they would
simply choose to stay even if oﬀered a job outside the community and it would be optimal to choose
b h = h∗, since
∂vp(h,θ)
∂h > 0. For this reason, I hereafter concentrate on equilibrium in which b h = h∗.
Suppose there are two communities: community 1 and community 2, with corresponding exit
probabilities δ1 and δ2. In both communities let there be a negative relationship between investment
in human capital and the likelihood of future interactions with the community, though in community
2, allow the slope to be steeper. So, community 2 can be thought of as a “tougher” neighborhood.
The following result shows that agents who opt for cooperation in community 2 (the “tougher”
neighborhood) will actually invest more in human capital than those who opt for cooperation in
community 1. In other words, increasing the porosity between neighborhoods has the unintended
eﬀect of increasing the fragility of cooperation in social interactions. The fraction of students,
however, who opt for cooperation in community 2 is smaller. And, for any student who would
opt for cooperation in either community — he would invest more in human capital in the tougher
neighborhood.
insert ﬁgure 6
Proposition 3 If δ1 (h) >δ 2 (h) for all h ∈ [0,h ∗], then S2 ⊆ S1, h1 ≥ h2, and
R
S2
b h1 (θ)dF (θ) >
R
S2
b h2 (θ)dF (θ) where hi =
R
Si
b h(θ)dF (θ).
Proof. We know from equation (1) that if δ increases, h∗ decreases, and subsequently, c∗
increases. It follows directly that S1 ⊇ S2. To speciﬁcally extrapolate the implications of this
eﬀect, see ﬁgure 5. In this, the agents whom opt for cooperation (depicted in (A)), must choose
a lower level of human capital b h = h∗∗ in order to gain cooperation. In this sense, increasing the
fragility of the relationship by increasing the probability that one can leave the community has the
eﬀect of suppressing the human capital of those who opt for cooperation. However, as pictured in
case (B), suﬃciently talented agents are not eﬀected by this, given they invest all of their energies
into human capital, regardless. The Proposition follows directly.
Proposition 3 is a key result that diﬀerentiates the current model from previous work at the
intersections of social capital, culture, and economics. It provides a very striking and unique pre-
diction: when social mobility between neighborhoods increases, agents in poor neighborhoods will
12invest even more in their local culture — as it serves as a strong signal of their group committment.
In what follows the model is applied in a myriad of applications and its predictions discussed.
3 Understanding Black Progress in the US Through the Lens of
the Model
In this section, I explore a variety of examples and applications of the basic theory. Although
it is simple, its empirical predictions and testable implications are quite consistent with several
important facts concerning Black progress in the US: the adoption of distinctively Black names,
the decline of black neighborhoods in the 1970’s, educational achievement, and the eﬃcacy of
particular educational and job interventions programs.
Distinctive Black Names
insert ﬁgure 7
The fundamental predictions to test from the social interaction model, that will allow one to
diﬀerentiate it from other models of social capital and culture (Berman 2000, Borjas 1992 and 1995,
Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote 2002, Iannocone 1992, and Lazear 1999), are the predictions in
Proposition 3 concerning agents equilibrium responses to exogenous changes in social mobility. A
nice test of these predictions is to focus on one dimension of investment in group speciﬁc capital— the
distinctive choice of ﬁrst names. The model predicts that as the porosity between neighborhoods
increases, names of those in black neighborhoods (who opt for cooperation) will get unambiguously
blacker while names of blacks in white neighborhoods (who opt out) will get whiter — creating a
bifurcation in the distribution of black names.
Figure 7 provides empirical evidence to this eﬀect, demonstrating a striking time series pat-
tern that shows a bifurcation in the distribution of African American ﬁrst names, circa 1968.13
Two years after the Fair Housing Act, which reduced the barriers to integration, blacks living in
13The data used are drawn from the Birth Statistical Master File maintained by the Oﬃce of Vital Records in the
California Department of Health Services. These ﬁles provide information drawn from birth certiﬁcates for virtually
all children born in California over the period 1961-2000, which has been supplemented with personal identiﬁers
including mother’s ﬁrst name, mother’s maiden name, and child’s full name.
13predominantly black neighborhoods start to adopt distinctively “black” names, whereas blacks liv-
ing in predominantly white neighborhoods adopt traditional white names. The numbers are quite
startling. The median black female in a predominantly black area went from receiving a name
that was twice as likely to be Black (before the Fair Housing Act) to a name that was more than
twenty times as likely to be given to Blacks. Among Blacks in integrated neighborhoods, no such
transformation occurred, with Black names actually becoming more similar to whites. These data
provide a direct test of the model, if one assumes that the choice of a ﬁrst name is a group-speciﬁc
investment decision.
The weakness in the argument, however, is that Fryer and Levitt (2004) ﬁnd no causal impact
of names on adult outcomes. In order for names to serve as a commitment device, they need to
represent a costly investment. This can be easily reconciled in that names are just one dimension
one can signal their group loyalty.
Historical Applications
From American Chattel slavery through Jim Crow, social mobility among Blacks was eﬀectively
zero. During this time, investing in human capital was not seen as a threat of leaving the community
because δ (·) was highly inelastic, due to institutional barriers. In a typical black community,
doctors, lawyers, postmen, and others with lower occupational status, lived in the same vicinity.
With the decrease in institutional discrimination and the increase in housing integration came many
new opportunities, including the choice of moving to a more integrated neighborhood.
Game theoretically, this integration changed the game from a inﬁnitely repeated game in which
the probability of future interactions other individuals was near one, to a game in which agents leave
with a probability that depends on their human capital investments. With this change, community
monitoring of agents’ human capital became an important predictor of their future behavior.
In his classic portrayal of neighborhoods in Chicago, Wilson (1978) argues that the African
American community was splitting into two, with middle class blacks increasing their position
relative to whites, and poor blacks becoming even more marginalized. Wilson’s conjecture is that
the plight of the black inner cities was due to the erosion of their social networks and social capital.
This element of self-selection is readily seen in the framework presented here, as δ (·) changes over
time. There are, however, some subtle diﬀerences. Whereas Wilson argues that networks are to
14blame, I argue that the very presence of high ability blacks and institutional barriers allowed those
on the margin to invest more in human capital without loosing cooperation.
Policy Interventions
A myriad programs seek to diﬀerentiate and improve the educational environment for inner-
city or poor youth by on-site or remote training. To date, most of the focus on educational
interventions have been on early childhood development. Model programs of this kind include the
Milwaukee Project (Garber 1988), Early Training Project (Gray et. al. 1983), High/Scope Perry
Pre-school Project (Schweinhart, et. al. 1993), and the Carolina Abecedarian Project (Campbell
and Ramey 1994). There are fewer programs that target secondary school students. Interventions
include gifted and talented programs within schools and counseling/mentoring programs. Oﬀering
separate courses or co-curricular organizations for high achieving students is equivalent to adding
non-random matching into the basic model in an eﬀort to induce sorting on ability. Oﬀering remote
training or moving kids out of their neighborhoods can also induce sorting, or more importantly,
change the functional form of δ (·) depending on which type of program is pursued. I discuss each
of these programs in turn within the context of the basic model and tangential extensions.
Honors courses, co-curricular activities (i.e. math club, upward bound, etc.), and counsel-
ing/mentoring programs are a common component of many secondary schools. A simple extension
of the basic model allows us to investigate the implications of such interventions in particular
communities where the social interaction game is being played.
Consider the following extension of the basic model. Students can choose to join one of two
groups: the cool group or the smart group, with an epsilon cost of joining the cool group. After
observing their talent, students choose their group-speciﬁc investment, c, and are randomly matched
with members within their group with probability γ>1
2. Students’ expected payoﬀ of investing ci,
in the social interaction game, if they choose to cooperate is then α. Solving the model with this
simple extension proves that all individuals in the smart group invest h =1and all individuals in
the cool group invest h = b h. This is an equilibrium, since no cool students want to join the smart
group, given they will get no value out of the social interaction game, and no smart students want
to join the cool group—given the epsilon cost.14 Indeed, in some cases, all agents are weakly better
14This follows from the fact that there are no human capital externalities in the model from interacting with
15oﬀ under this assortative matching type equilibrium.
Remote training programs are another form of educational intervention for secondary school
students, though less common. They involve taking students out of their classroom environments
and engaging them in educational programs away from their communities. This usually takes
one of two forms: students are removed from their community for a ﬁxed amount of time (day,
summer, etc.), or students are removed from their community permanently. The former char-
acterization is equivalent to the sorting type equilibrium previously described. Versions of the
latter characterization include the Gautreaux program, a major initiative adopted by the courts to
provide a metropolitan-wide remedy for racial discrimination in Chicago’s public housing, Moving-
to-Opportunity, Job Corps, and the well known A Better Chance Program15. In the A Better
Chance initiative, students leave their families and live with a host family to attend better schools.
Consider the following quote from a student in the A Better Chance Program.
“I felt I could be more involved with my studies here [in the host family]. At home, I
would be distracted by peer pressures to hang out, smoke and drink. Here, I can focus
on the academics. You face peer pressure wherever you go, but at Radnor there are
more kids into their studies.16”
The social interaction model predicts that these types of interventions, will have larger marginal
eﬀects on students’ educational achievement because they change δ (·). Other interventions induce
sorting, but have an ambiguous eﬀect on the marginal student. The available evidence suggests that
this is indeed the case. Sixty-ﬁve percent of the students in the A Better Chance program come
from single parent families and thirty-three percent of them are beneath the poverty threshold;
however, ninety-nine percent of the A Better Chance seniors immediately enroll in college. This is
signiﬁcantly larger than any other secondary educational intervention. However, there are thorny
selection issues to consider before one can test the programs causal impacts.
More convincing are the results from analysis of the Job Start and Job Corps programs. Job
Corps is the nation’s largest and most comprehensive residential, education and job training pro-
students in the smart group. In general, we know that learning begets learning (see Heckman, 2000). This complicates
matters, but does not take away from the qualitative insights of the result.
15To read more about this program, visit http:\\www.abetterchance.org
16“Going ‘Away’ to School in Radnor: A Better Chance for Teens Who Put Their Schooling First.” The Suburban
and Wayne Times, September 23, 1999.
16gram for at-risk youth, ages 16 through 24. It takes the students to (predominantly rural) training
centers where they receive free room and board along with intense training in one of 100 vocational
specializations. Conversely, Job Start uses the same teaching curricula as Job Corp, but the stu-
dents stay at home and commute to a local training site. As the model would predict, Job Corps
has larger eﬀects. It has been shown that Job Corp increases earnings and reduces crime, whereas,
Job Start has shown statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀects.17
Essentially, the aim of any educational intervention, mindful of the type of peer eﬀects described
here, must be geared toward changing δ (·) or decreasing α — which have diﬀerent implications for
policy depending on which is pursued. Changing δ (·) literally involves moving kids from low income
neighborhoods to suburbia or changing the nature of interaction between high achieving students
who get out and those who are left behind. Conversely, changing α involves minimizing social
interactions and the development of peer groups within schools.
A nice test of the eﬃcacy of the latter policy would be to investigate the black-white achievement
gap among military children at military schools, where presumably, racial diﬀerences in cultural
capital are minimal. The theory predicts that these gaps will be substantially smaller. As evidence
to this eﬀect, Brown (2003) shows that white children from military families score slightly higher
than do their civilian counterparts, while black children from military families do signiﬁcantly better
than black children from non-military families. The test score gap is about 40 percent smaller in
the military than in civilian schools.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Blacks antagonize fellow blacks for not being “black enough,” whites ridicule other whites for
“trying to act black,” and Italian immigrants mock other Italian immigrants for being “sissies.”
Some observe these behaviors and conclude that those who ridicule others are punishing them
because they have formed an oppositional culture against certain behaviors of other cultures, have
an intrinsic preference for seeing them suﬀer, or some unspeciﬁed social forces have led to such
behavior. The economic explanation, however, is quite diﬀerent.
By using a simple model of social interactions with an endogenous probability that the re-
17See http://www.jobcorps.org and http://www.mdrc.org/project_9_60.html for results on Job Corp and Job
Start programs, respectively.
17lationship will end in any period, cooperation can only be sustained with those members of the
community who they are suﬃciently likely to interact with in the future. There is no preference
based punishment mechanism needed, just rational defection when an agent’s probability of being
around in the future is too low. This causes agents in these communities to optimally trade oﬀ
cooperation with community and economic success. Using this simple approach, I have shown
that some individuals subject to group-speciﬁc investments are worse oﬀ because these observable
investments are used, in equilibrium, as a litmus test of group loyalty. I have also shown that as
the value of human capital increases, the inter and intra group inequality can increase. This is a
direct result of the discontinuity and non-concavity in the student’s objective function. Further, as
social mobility increases the cultural capital phenomenon should become even more profound and
not, as the leading sociological theory would suggest, die out.
One shortcoming of the current approach is that defection in the repeated game may not coincide
with the active antagonistic behavior that motivated the present study. There are many types of
social interactions at work in communities, simultaneously, and I have chosen to highlight one. How
this ﬁts into a larger framework of group dynamics and collective identity is left for future work.
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